The draft White Paper on Police states that South
Africa is entitled to a police service 'that exhibits exemplary leadership and management'. 4 It further refers to the importance of ethical leadership and how 'police leadership and management must ensure a clear normative standard of the highest quality'. The article argues that the crisis of police leadership 
Police leadership in a democracy
Policing 'refers to the work of the public, civilian (nonmilitary) institution that is empowered by government to enforce the law and ensure public order through the legitimised use of force'. 7 It has been argued by international policing experts such as Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Professor Gary T Marx that one element that defines a democracy is a police force that:
• Is subject to the rule of law, embodying values respectful of human dignity, rather than the wishes of a powerful leader or party
• Can intervene in the life of citizens only under limited and carefully controlled circumstances
• Is publicly accountable 8 Indeed, international research on the democratic objectives of police agencies holds that police should, inter alia, strive to:
• Promote public trust and confidence (necessary prerequisites for effective policing)
• Stand outside of politics while protecting the democratic rights of the public (for example to exercise free speech, freedom of association and other democratic rights)
• Be guided by the principle that everyone shall be subject to limitations determined by law when intervening in conflicts between groups or individuals 9 In crafting a new vision and orientation for the police in South Africa, the drafters of the South African The findings of the commission as they relate to senior police leadership in the SAPS can now be assessed against the key principles and characteristics highlighted above. This exercise will provide some insight into the nature of the challenges implicitly referred to by the NDP and the White Paper as they pertain to the senior police leadership at the time of writing.
The serial crisis and politicisation of top police management
The SA Constitution mandates the president to appoint the SAPS national commissioner. 16 However, it has been argued that, unlike many other senior appointments, there are inadequate minimum objective criteria to guide the president when making this appointment. 17 The and reintroduced military ranks to the SAPS in 2011. 21 Cele was eventually fired by the president on the recommendation of a board of inquiry into his fitness to hold office, following a public outcry over his involvement in tender irregularities involving R1.7 billion. 22 As with Selebi before him, the removal of the most senior SAPS commander, following a highly publicised scandal, could not have been positive for police morale or public credibility.
Zuma then appointed Riah Phiyega to the post of SAPS national commissioner on 13 June 2012. At the time of her appointment, much was made of her prior management experience. 23 However, her lack of police experience and any proven ability to address the types of organisational challenges facing the SAPS was publicly raised as a concern at the time. 24 A little more than a year after her appointment, the ongoing negative publicity surrounding Phiyega once again raised questions about her suitability for the post of national commissioner. as an accurate assessment. 36 The commission found that any decision by police commanders to use force, when in all probability such force would be unnecessary, could be considered to be an illegal decision. 37 Moreover, they had breached the McCann Principle, accepted in South African law, 'which requires the planners of policing operations where force may possibly be used to plan and command the operations in such a way as to minimise the risk that lethal force will be used'.
38
Concerns about a lack of integrity and accountability
One of the more damning findings of the commission regarding the SAPS national commissioner and her senior managers was that they had sought to mislead the commission. The commission found that, in an effort to distract from police failings at Marikana, the scene was set for a 'cover-up' very early on. 41 The commission agreed with arguments that this conference was used by the SAPS leadership as an 'opportunity to collude' in order to construct 'tailored' evidence, withhold certain damning evidence and provide other evidence that was 'materially false' before the commission so as to support the SAPS's manufactured version of events at Marikana both in the run-up to and during the massacre. 42 The commission agreed that both the national and provincial commissioners had seen the (SAPS) presentation prior to being submitted to the Commission and they would have been well aware of some of the omissions and misleading information contained therein. 43 The evidence leaders' closing submission in this regard was that Phiyega 'gave false evidence to the commission and her evidence before the commission was generally characterised by a lack of candor'. 44 The evidence leaders also argued that Phiyega's 'immediate response to the shootings was incompatible with the office of the head of a police service in a constitutional state'. 45 The commission accepted that the most senior police leaders had been dishonest and therefore recommended that the president establish a board of inquiry under section 8 (1) of the SAPS Act to consider the fitness of Phiyega and Mbombo to hold office in the SAPS. This was due to the finding that senior SAPS leadership at the 'highest level' gave false or misleading evidence before the commission and should therefore be the subject of an inquiry to establish whether they were guilty of misconduct in attempting to mislead the commission. 46 The impact of compromised police leadership to take all steps necessary for the prosecution and finalisation of these proceedings'. 56 At the time of writing, 15 months after this judgement, the SAPS national commissioner had yet to take disciplinary action against Mdluli, and reportedly allowed his perks and privileges to continue, at great cost to the state. 57 The Crime Intelligence An additional indicator that all is not well within the SAPS is the substantial increase in the number of people leaving the organisation. In the four years ending in 2012/13, the average number of people leaving the SAPS stood at 2 743. 59 However, this has risen dramatically since then, so that in the 2014/15 financial year, over 7 000 people left the SAPS. 60 It was also revealed that of this number 1 200 were detectives, a division already experiencing severe shortages. 61 The consequence of the deterioration of intelligence and the loss of experienced detectives can be seen in the substantial growth of violent acquisitive crime in South Africa. In 2013/14, a total of 119 351 aggravated robberies were reported to the police. 62 This is over 18 000 more armed robberies than were reported to the police two years ago, in 2011/12. • The national commissioner and deputies should be appointed by the president after recommendations by a selection panel that would select and interview candidates against objective criteria, following a transparent and competitive recruitment process. 
